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Chapter 3: The Social Orientation of India’s Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) 
Program 
Abstract 
Launched in October 1975, India’s Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) program is its 
largest national program for promoting the health and development of mothers and their children. This 
chapter examines an aspect of the ICDS program that has been neglected, namely who are its 
beneficiaries? Are they persons from deprived groups who, but for the program, might not have 
received such services? Or are they persons from more privileged groups who have the resources to 
acquire them from other sources? In both cases the ICDS program adds value but, in the latter 
situation, it does so by displacing existing services. This particular evaluation of the ICDS program is 
particularly important in the light of the Government of India’s view, as articulated in its Eleventh 
Five Year Plan, that growth is not perceived as “sufficiently inclusive for many groups, especially 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Minorities”. The chapter presents econometric estimates 
regarding the relative strength of the personal and household circumstances of persons in determining 
the likelihood of utilising anganwadi services. Lastly, the chapter suggests a trade-off between quality 
and utilisation by hypothesising that the poor quality of services leads upper caste mothers to exit the 





Launched in October 1975, India’s Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) program is 
its largest national program – and one of the largest such programs in the world - for promoting the 
health and development of mothers and their children.  The scheme is targeted at children below the 
age of 6 years and their mothers (particularly if they are pregnant and lactating) and the benefits take 
the form of inter alia supplementary nutrition, immunisation, regular health checks, referral services, 
education on nutrition and health, and pre-school learning. In addition, mothers and children are 
provided with iron, folic acid, vitamin A tablets to combat, respectively, iron deficiency, anaemia, and 
xerophthalmia.  The scheme – which is based on the principle that the overall impact of these benefits 
would be greater if they were provided in an integrated manner, rather than on a piecemeal basis - is 
administered from a centre, called the Anganwadi (meaning village courtyard) by workers, and their 
helpers, trained and paid an honorarium under the scheme (Kapil and Pradhan, 1999).  Over 58 
million children, aged 0-6 years, were covered by this scheme in 2006-07 and this was expected to 
rise to over 72 million in 2008-09 (Diwakar, 2010). 
Many aspects of the ICDS have been examined by researchers and, in particular, the delivery 
of specific services (Ghosh, 2006 on feeding practices; Tandon and Gandhi, 1992 on immunisation) 
and the delivery of ICDS services in specific parts of the country (Sundararaman, 2006 on 
Chhattisgarh; Nayak and Saxena (2006) on Bihar and Jharkhand; Rajivan, 2006 on Tamil Nadu).  
However, one aspect of the delivery of anganwadi services that has been neglected in the literature is 
the issue of who are the beneficiaries? Are they mothers (and their children) from deprived groups 
who, but for anganwadis, might not have received such services and, indeed, might not have been 
aware of the importance of such services? Or, are they mothers (and children) from more privileged 
groups who, even in the absence of anganwadis, would recognise the importance of such services and 
have the resources to acquire them from other sources. In both cases, anganwadis would add value to 
the lives of mothers and children but, in the latter situation, they would do so by displacing existing 
services. 
The evidence on social exclusion in relation to the ICDS program is at best mixed and has 
been summarised by Gill (2012). Three studies of “exclusionary bias” in the delivery of ICDS 
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services (FOCUS, 2006; Mander and Kumaram, 2006; and Thorat and Sadana, 2009) conclude that 
locational factors underpinned, and perpetuated, such bias. First, there was a relative lack of 
anganwadis in Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), and Muslim habitations; second, even in 
mixed-caste villages, the village anganwadi was usually not located in the parts in which the deprived 
groups lived.1 Although the location of anganwadis is an ostensibly neutral factor, Mander and 
Kumaram (2006) in a study of 14 villages across four states (Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh) argued that “it is not a mere accident that in none of the surveyed 
mixed-caste villages was the anganwadi located in a SC or ST hamlet. The decision to locate not just 
the anganwadi, but also other valued institutions and services, in the upper caste so-called ‘main’ 
village is influenced by the upper caste and class [sic] and politically powerful groups in the village.” 
However, as FOCUS (2009) showed, ST children in certain sampled districts comprised 27 
percent of the total number of children in these districts but as much as 40 percent of the total number 
of children enrolled in the districts’ anganwadis. So, even though locational factors might militate 
against inclusivity, the utilisation of ICDS services, as measured by enrolment in anganwadis, would 
suggest that while better location could improve inclusivity, inclusivity per se is not a problem. On 
the other hand, Mander and Kumaram (2006) claimed that, in addition to the locational factor 
(discussed earlier), “a large number of eligible children from impoverished and food deprived 
households did not access ICDS services, including supplementary nutrition for infant and small 
children….and that the denial of these services is not random or accidental but is frequently the 
outcome of active social discrimination, based on caste, gender and disability.” 
Following from this mixed bag of results, some based on data from specific parts of India, the 
purpose of this chapter is to use all-India data to evaluate the ICDS programme from the perspective 
of inclusivity firstly through econometric estimates regarding the relative strength of the personal and 
household circumstances of persons in determining the likelihood of utilising ICDS services; 
secondly, by estimating the proportion of inter-group differences in utilisation rates that is the result 
                                                     
1 Articles 341 and 342 of the Indian Constitution include a list of castes and tribes entitled to special benefits 
(mainly in the form of reserved seats in the national parliament, state legislatures, municipality boards and 
village councils (panchayats); job reservations in the public sector; and reserved places in public higher 
educational institutions) and all those groups included in this list  (and subsequent modifications to this list) are 
referred to as, respectively,  “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes”. 
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of inter-group differences in personal and household characteristics and the residual proportion which 
is the result of caste/religious identity; and thirdly, by suggesting a trade-off between quality and 
utilisation by hypothesising that the poor quality of ICDS services leads the Hindu upper castes to exit 
the ICDS market and seek these services elsewhere. 
The evaluation of the ICDS program, as summarised above, is particularly important in the 
light of the Government of India’s view, as articulated in its Eleventh Five Year Plan, that growth is 
not perceived as “sufficiently inclusive for many groups, especially Scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes, and Minorities”.2 In terms of the Government of India’s flagship social welfare programs, of 
which the ICDS is one (the others being the Total Sanitation Program and the National Rural Health 
Mission), access to services by people from deprived groups is the key to inclusivity. An important 
purpose of this chapter is to measure the relative access to ICDS services by mothers and children 
from “deprived” groups, compared to access by those from more “privileged” groups. 
The results reported in this paper are based on data provided by the Indian Human 
Development Survey (IHDS) for 2011, hereafter IHDS-2011, which asked ever married women 
between the ages of 15 and 49 (hereafter, “eligible women”) about whether they utilised various types 
of ICDS services (Desai, et. al., 2015).3   Of these 39,523 women, 2,729 did not have any children 
and hence were excluded from this chapter’s analysis. The 36,794 women who were subject of 
analysis are hereafter referred to as “mothers”. In addition to information about the mothers’ 
households, the IHDS also provided information on their circumstances in terms of inter alia their 
age, education level, household economic status, region of residence, rural/urban location, and their 
degree of autonomy within their households. It should be emphasised that this chapter is an analysis 
of access to ICDS services by mothers of differing personal and household circumstances. It is not an 
analysis of their access to health services in general or, about the quality of the health services they 
accessed or, indeed, about their (and their children’s) health outcomes. 
3.2 Benefits Under the ICDS 
                                                     
2 The Planning Commission (2008). 
3 The structure of IHDS-2011 was described in some detail in chapter 2. 
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 The IHDS-2011 distinguished between six different types of services which (eligible) women 
could have received from anganwadis: 
1. Benefits while pregnant or lactating. These included supplementary feeding, prophylaxis 
against vitamin A deficiency and control of nutritional anaemia. Also included were the 
immunisation of pregnant women against tetanus and nutritional and health education to build 
the capacity of women to look after themselves and their children.  
2. Immunisation of child/children against six major diseases: polio, diphtheria, pertussis, 
tetanus, tuberculosis, and measles.  
3. Health checks for children including: management of malnutrition, treatment of diarrhoea, de-
worming, and distribution of medicines. Also included were the antenatal care of expectant, 
and postnatal care of nursing, mothers. 
4. Monitoring children’s growth, with sick or malnourished children and children with 
disabilities being referred to the Primary Health Centre.  
5. Providing children with pre-school education. In addition to preparing children for primary 
school, this service also offers substitute care to young children thus freeing older siblings – 
particularly girls – to attend school.   
6. Supplementary feeding support for children for 300 days in a year with a view to narrowing 
the gap between the nationally recommended calorific intake and that received by the 
children.  
<Figures 3.1-3.4 > 
 The mothers were asked whether they had received each of the benefits, enumerated above, 
for their last birth.  Figure 3.1 shows that, after applying sample weights, only 28.2 percent of the 
mothers - who gave valid responses to the question “When you were pregnant and lactating did you 
receive benefits, such as immunisation, supplementary food etc., from an anganwadi?” - answered in 
the affirmative. Similarly, only 45 percent of the mothers said their (last) child had been immunised at 
an anganwadi; 29.7 percent said their (last) child’s health had been checked at an anganwadi; 39.1 
percent said their (last) child’s growth had been monitored at an anganwadi; 24.1 percent said their 
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(last) child had received pre-school education at an anganwadi; and 40.1 percent said their (last) child 
had received food from an anganwadi.4  The low take-up of the educational benefits of the ICDS 
programme is particularly worrying since the government describes pre-school education as the 
“backbone of the ICDS program”. 5 
 Figure 3.1 also shows that the receipt of benefits varied according to social group.  Eligible 
women from the ST had the highest rate of utilisation (for example, 64.8 percent of EW from the 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) had had their last born immunised at an anganwadi followed by eligible 
women from the Scheduled Castes (SC) and the non-Muslim Other Backward Classes (NMOBC): 
45.9 and 49.7 percent, respectively, of these mothers had had their last born immunised at 
anganwadis.  At the other extreme, eligible women who were Muslim and from the non-Muslim 
Upper Classes (NMUC) had the lowest take-up of anganwadi benefits: for example, only 31.3 percent 
of Muslim mothers and 36.9 percent of NMUC mothers had utilised an anganwadi for vaccinating 
their last born child.  So, while it was laudable that the highest rates of utilisation of anganwadi 
benefits were by SC and ST women, it was worrying that Muslim women exhibited such a low rate of 
utilisation compared to, say, non-Muslims from the OBC.6  
 Some of the difficulties that Muslim mothers faced in accessing anganwadi services also 
applied to SC and ST mothers. The Human Development Sector (2004), in a report for the World 
Bank, reported that the community or caste of the anganwadi worker affected access: in one case 
cited, a worker was averse to having SC children come to the anganwadi because her father-in-law 
objected to the presence of lower caste children. 
                                                     
4 The first feature of note about these figures for take-up of anganwadi benefits is that they represent a 
considerable improvement on such take-up rates based on data from the Indian Human Development Survey for 
2005 (hereafter, IHDS-2005) and reported in Borooah et. al. (2014): according to IHDS-2005, the take-up rates 
for benefits 1-6 were, respectively, 20.5, 26.2,19.7, 21.7, 21.6, and 9.2 percent. These figures are consistent with 
those from other sources. For example, Sinha (2006) estimated that only 22 percent of India’s young children 
were being served by the ICDS program though she did not provide details by type of benefit. 
5 See http://wcd.nic.in/icds.htm (accessed on 6 June 2017). 
6 A study conducted by Indian Institute of Dalit Studies (IIDS) in four states - UP, MP, Bihar and West Bengal - 
covering 895 respondents, corroborates this finding by showing that, compared to upper caste non-Muslim 
mothers,  ICDS participation was higher for SC and ST mothers but lower for Muslim mothers. According to 
this study, 69 percent of Muslim mothers, compared to 78 percent of Hindu mothers, utilised anganwadi 
services provided for children up to 3 years of age and 76 percent of Muslim mothers, compared to 83 percent 
Hindu mothers, utilised services provided for children in the of 3-6 years age group (Borooah et. al., 2014). 
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In addition, because of the location of anganwadis in parts of the village where the upper 
castes lived (see Mander and Kumaram, 2006), mothers from vulnerable groups had to travel through 
unfriendly areas to reach the school. It was one thing to brave this journey for the occasional visit to 
the anganwadis – to have the child immunised, to have his/her health checked or growth monitored – 
but it was quite another thing to have to suffer this journey twice daily. Consequently, for this reason 
also, mothers from vulnerable groups could have opted out of sending their children to anganwadis 
for pre-school education.  
  However, overlaying these difficulties faced by mothers from all the vulnerable groups in 
accessing anganwadi services, patriarchal restrictions on the mobility of Muslim women outside the 
family home, unaccompanied by another household member, were a specific reason for the poor 
utilisation of anganwadi services by Muslim mothers. Although SC mothers also had difficulty 
accessing anganwadi services – through, for example, the reluctance of anganwadi workers to visit 
SC hamlets - they did not, experience any familial restraints on their mobility outside the home.  
Consequently, by going out of the family home (perhaps, for work), SC mothers were able to acquire 
information themselves about anganwadi services without the intermediation of anganwadi workers.  
On the other hand, Muslim mothers, who lacked this mobility, were much more reliant on visits by 
anganwadi workers for such information and this restricted their access to anganwadi services.7 
 Figure 3.2 shows that the lowest rate of utilisation of anganwadi benefits was by well 
educated women (graduate or above) with utilisation rates by women with no education, or primary or 
secondary education being roughly similar.  Figure 3.3 shows that poorer women (in the lowest two 
quintiles of household per-capita consumption expenditure, hereafter HPCE) had markedly higher 
rates of utilisation than women from more affluent (quintiles 4 and 5) households while Figure 3.4 
shows that the women in the Southern, Western, and Eastern regions of India had much higher rates 
of utilisation than women living in the North or the Centre.  
3.3. Estimating the Strength of Factors Influencing the Utilisation of Anganwadi Services        
                                                     
7 The IHDS-2011 showed that 31 percent of Muslim mothers, compared to 27 percent of SC mothers and 23 
percent of NMUC mothers could not visit a health centre by themselves. 
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 The previous section established that the utilisation rates of anganwadi services differed 
between mothers from different social groups (Figure 3.1), and also differed between mothers of 
different educational (Figure 3.2), economic (Figure 3.3), and regional attributes (Figure 3.4).  This 
section estimates the relative strength of the different factors which exercised a significant influence 
on the utilisation of anganwadi services and, in particular, it enquires whether, after controlling for 
non-social group factors, there was still significant correlation between the mothers’ social group and 
their utilisation rates? 
 The answers to these questions were provided by estimating logit equations for each of the six  
services provided through anganwadis – namely, benefits to pregnant and lactating mothers and 
children’s immunisation, health check, growth monitoring, early education, and supplementary food - 
with the dependent variable for each equation taking the value 1 if the mother utilised that benefit for 
her last born child and 0 if she did not.  It should be emphasised that in estimating the logit model, it 
was not possible, for reasons of multicollinearity, to include all the categories with respect to the 
variables: the category that was omitted for a variable is referred to as the reference category (for that 
variable).  
If Pr[yi=1] and Pr[yi=0] represent, respectively, the probabilities of utilisation and non-
utilisation, the logit formulation expresses the log of the odds ratio as a linear function of  K variables 
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where: βk is the coefficient associated with variable k, k=1…K. 



















  (3.2) 
where, the term ‘e’, in the above equation represents the exponential term.   
The explanatory variables for the equations were:  
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1. The sex of the last born child. 
2. The social group of the mother’s household: Scheduled Tribe (ST), Scheduled Caste (SC), 
non-Muslim Other Backward Classes (NMOBC), Muslims, non-Muslim Upper Classes 
(NMUC). 
3. The region in which the mother’s household resided: the North (comprising the states of 
Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab (including Chandigarh), and 
Uttarakhand); the Centre (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and 
Uttar Pradesh); the East (Assam,  Orissa, West Bengal); the West (Gujarat and Maharashtra); 
and the South (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu).  
4. The location of the mother’s household: rural or urban.  
5. The highest level of education of the mother: none, primary, secondary, higher secondary, 
graduate and above.  In terms of its effect on children’s well-being, most studies focus on the 
education of the mother and hypothesise that the higher the mother’s education, the better her 
feeding and care practices towards her children (Caldwell, 1979 and 1986; Hobcraft, 1993).  
6. The household’s per capita consumption expenditure (HPCE) by quintile: lowest, 2nd 
quintile, 3rd quintile, 4th quintile, highest quintile. 
7. The age of the mother set out in five-year bands: 15-20; 21-25; 26-30; 31-35; 36-40. 
8.  The degree of a mother’s autonomy in respect of whether she could travel alone or had to be 
accompanied by another person. 
 However, the logit estimates, that is the βk of equation (3.1), themselves do not have a natural 
interpretation – they exist mainly as a basis for computing more meaningful statistics and the most 
useful of these are the predicted probabilities defined by equation (3.2). Consequently, as Long and 
Freese (2014) suggested, results from the estimated equation were computed, from the estimated logit 
coefficients of the utilisation equations, as the predicted probability of using - or, equivalently, the 






The PUR associated with mothers in the different variable groups shown in Table 3.1 were 
computed through a series of simulations.  The PUR of ST mothers, with respect to their last born, 
was computed by assuming that all the mothers in the estimation sample were from the ST but that 
their non-social group attributes  –gender of the last born child, region, location, highest education,  
consumption quintile, age group, freedom to travel unaccompanied – were unchanged at observed 
values.  Then the ST coefficient was applied to this synthetic sample of ‘all-ST mothers’ in order to 
compute the PUR for the ST, shown in Table 3.1, under the columns headed ‘Probability’, as 44.6 
percent  for pregnancy benefits, 55.1 percent for immunisation, 43.4 percent for health check-up, 52.7 
percent for growth monitoring,  30.4 percent for education, and 50.4 percent for food.   
The PUR for mothers from the NMUC (which was the reference group) were computed 
similarly, this time assuming that all the mothers were from the NMUC with the mothers’ non-social 
group attributes being as observed.  Applying the NMUC coefficients to this synthetic sample of ‘all-
NMUC mothers’ yielded the PUR for NMUC mothers, shown in Table 3.1, under the columns headed 
‘Probability’, as 25.9 percent  for pregnancy benefits, 39.8 percent for immunisation, 28.7 percent for 
health check-up, 38.5 percent for growth monitoring,  24.4 percent for education, and 37.4 percent for 
food.  Since the only difference between the ‘all-ST mothers’ and the ‘all-NMUC’ synthetic samples 
was the social group to which the mothers belonged, the difference between the two sets of PUR 
could be attributed entirely to social group difference. 
The marginal PUR, shown under the column headed ‘MP’ in Table 3.1 is the difference 
between the PUR of the category in question and that of the reference category.  For example, the 
PUR of ST and NMUC (the reference category) mothers in respect of pregnancy benefits are, 
respectively, 44.6 and 25.9 percent yielding a marginal PUR of 18.7 percent (= 44.6-25.9).  The ** 
against the marginal PUR indicates that this difference in PUR between ST and NMUC mothers was 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 8 
 Table 3.1 shows that, for all the six benefits offered by anganwadis, the PUR of ST, SC, and 
NMOBC mothers was significantly higher, but the PUR of Muslim mothers was significantly lower, 
                                                     
8 This means that the likelihood of observing these values, under the null hypothesis of no difference, was 
smaller than 5 percent. For reasons of economy, the associated standard errors are not shown but are available 
on request from the author. 
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than the corresponding PUR for NMUC mothers.9 The results detailed in Table 3.1 show that – after 
controlling for other factors10 - the predicted likelihood of utilising anganwadi services was highest 
for ST mothers, next highest for SC mothers, next highest for mothers from the NMOBC, next highest 
for mothers from the NMUC, and lowest for Muslim mothers.  So, in terms of reaching mothers from 
vulnerable groups, the evidence presented here suggests that anganwadi services were tilted in favour 
of mothers and children from the ST and the SC; however, a worrying features was that the likelihood 
of utilising anganwadi services by Muslim mothers was lower than that for Hindus. 
 There did not appear to be any gender bias with respect to the utilisation of anganwadi 
services. The difference between the PUR associated with male and female (last born) children was 
not  significantly different from for any of the five post-birth anganwadi services  It would appear, 
therefore, that in utilising anganwadi services, mothers were not influenced by whether these services 
were for a male or female child.  
 In the context of regions, Table 3.1 shows that, compared to mothers living in the North 
(which was the reference region), mothers living in the South, the West, and the East had significantly 
higher PUR for all anganwadi services.  In the context of location, compared to mothers in urban 
areas, rural mothers were much more likely, in terms of their PUR, to access anganwadi services: by 
17.3 points for lactating mothers, by 18.6 points for children’s immunisation; by 14.3 points for the 
children’s health check; by 15.4 points for children’s growth monitoring; by 11.1 points for children’s 
education; and by 15.4 points for children’s food. 
 In terms of the education of mothers, Table 3.1 shows that the PUR of mothers who were 
graduates (the reference educational category) was significantly lower than the PUR of mothers who 
either had no education or whose education did not exceed the secondary level.  So, not only was the 
ICDS tilted towards mothers from deprived social groups it was also slanted towards mothers with 
relatively low educational qualifications.  
                                                     
9 Except that there was no significant between the PUR of NMOC and NMUC mothers in respect of children’s 
education benefit and that there was no significant between the PUR of Muslim and NMUC mothers in respect 
of food for children. 
10 These were: gender of the last born child, region, location, highest education, consumption quintile, age 
group, and freedom to travel unaccompanied. 
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 The economic position of the mothers – as measured by their HPCE – also exerted a 
significant influence on their PUR. The PUR of mothers who belonged to the highest quintile of 
HPCE (the reference economic category) was significantly lower than the PUR of mothers who 
belonged to the lowest three quintiles of HPCE. Compared to mothers in the highest HPCE quintile, 
mothers in the lowest quintile of HPCE were much more likely, in terms of their PUR, to access 
anganwadi services: by 10.5 points for lactating mothers, by 5 points for children’s immunisation; by 
6.4 points for the children’s health check; by 10.8 points for children’s growth monitoring; by 8.5 
points for children’s education; and by 15.6 points for children’s food. 
   An important aspect affecting the utilisation of anganwadi services was the autonomy that 
mothers enjoyed in their households and, in particular, whether they were permitted by household 
members to travel to the health centre unaccompanied. Mothers who could travel unaccompanied had 
a significantly higher PUR for all anganwadi services than mothers who needed to be accompanied in 
order to avail of health services.  
 3.4. An Analytical Model for Decomposing the Probabilities of Utilising Anganwadi Services 
 The analysis of the previous section raises a more general question: how much of the mean 
difference in the utilisation of an ICDS service between mothers in the different social groups was due 
to differences between them in their (non-group) attributes (gender of the last born child, region, 
location, highest education, consumption quintile, age group, and freedom to travel unaccompanied)? 
And how much was due to the fact that the mothers belonged to different social groups?  The purpose 
of this section is to answer this question, using a method of decomposition pioneered by Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973), with respect to the following binary comparisons: (i) mothers from the SC 
versus NMUC mothers; (ii) Muslim mothers versus mothers from the NMUC. 
 The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) method of decomposing group differences in means 
into a “coefficients” effect and an “attributes” effect is, arguably, the most widely used decomposition 
technique in economics.  This method has been extended from its original setting within regression 
analysis to explaining group differences in probabilities derived from models of discrete choice with a 
binary dependent variable and estimated using logit/probit methods (Gomulka and Stern, 1990; 
Blackaby et. al., 1999; Nielsen, 1998; Borooah and Iyer, 2005; Sinning et.al., 2008).   
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 Under the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (and its extension to binary choice models) the 
sample is subdivided into mutually exclusive and (collectively exhaustive) groups - for example, by 
social group -  which allows one to decompose the difference in, for example, average utilisation rates 
of anganwadi services between SC and NMUC mothers into two parts, one due to inter-group 
differences in the coefficient vectors and the other due to differences between the groups in their 
attribute vectors.   
 The attributes effect is computed by asking what the average NMUC-SC difference in 
utilisation rates for a service would have been if the difference in attributes between NMUC and SC 
mothers had been evaluated using a common coefficient vector.  The coefficients effect is obtained by 
asking what the average NMUC-SC difference in utilisation rates for that service would have been if 
the average utilisation rate associated with a set of attributes (say, those of the SC) had been computed 
first using the NMUC, and then using the SC, coefficient vector.  These ideas are made explicit in the 
following paragraphs.  
 There are N mothers (indexed, i=1…N) who can be placed in K mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive social groups (hereafter simply ‘groups’), k=1..K, each group  containing Nk 
persons, k
k
N N=∑  .  Define the variable Yi such that Yi=1, if the mother utilised a particular ICDS 
benefit, Yi=0, if she did not.  Then, under a logit model, the likelihood of a mother, from group k, 
utilising that benefit is:  
 exp( ) ˆPr( 1) ( )
1 exp( )i






X β X β
X β
 (3.3) 
where: }{ , 1...ijX j J= =kiX represents the vector of observations, for mother i belonging to group k, on 
J variables which determine her likelihood of utilising a benefit, and }{ˆ , 1...kj j Jβ= =kβ is the 
associated vector of coefficient estimates for mothers belonging to group k.   
 The average probability of a mother from group k utilising an ICDS benefit is: 
 1
1





Y P N F−
=
= = ∑k k k ki iX ,β X β  (3.4) 
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Now for any two (of the K) groups, say Hindu (k=H) and Muslim (k=M):   
              
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ               [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
H MY Y P P
P P P P
− = −
= − + −
H H M M
i i
M H M M H H M H
i i i i
X ,β X ,β
X ,β X ,β X ,β X ,β
                 (3.5) 
which can be rearranged as: 
                
  
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]H M
coefficients effect attributes effect
Y Y P P P P− = − + −H H H M H M M Mi i i iX ,β X ,β X ,β X ,β
(((((((( ((((((((
                (3.6) 
 The first term in square brackets, in equation (3.6) represents the “coefficients effect”: it is the 
amount by which the mean probability of Hindus utilising an ICDS benefit (average utilisation rate of 
Hindus) would change if Hindu attributes ( HiX ), rather than being evaluated at Hindu coefficients (
ˆ Hβ ), were, instead, evaluated at Muslim coefficients ( ˆ Mβ ).  Under the “coefficients effect”, a 
particular set of attributes – in this case, Hindu – is evaluated using two different coefficient vectors – 
that of Hindus and Muslims.   
 The second term in square brackets in equation (3.6) represents the “attributes effect”:  it is 
the difference in the average utilisation rates which would result from both Hindu ( HiX ) and Muslim 
attributes ( MiX ) being evaluated using a common coefficient vector, that of Muslims ( ˆ
Mβ ).  Under the 
“attributes effect”, the same (Muslim) coefficient vector is used to evaluate two different attribute 
vectors – that of Hindus and Muslims.  Equation (3.6) shows the overall difference between Hindus 
and Muslims in their average utilisation rates as the sum of differences due to: (i) inter-group 
differences in coefficients (the “coefficients effect”); and (ii) inter-group differences in attributes (the 
“attributes effect”).  The coefficients contribution is the percentage of the overall difference in means,
H MY Y− , that is due to the “coefficients effect”.  Similarly, the attributes contribution is the 
percentage of the overall difference in means, H MY Y− , that is due to the “attributes effect”.   
 The same decomposition could have been achieved by using the Hindu coefficients ( ˆ Hβ ) as 
the common coefficient vector: 
 
  
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]H M
coefficients effect attributes effect
Y Y P P P P− = − + −M H M M H H M Hi i i iX ,β X ,β X ,β X ,β
(((((((( ((((((((
  (3.7) 
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 The first term in square brackets, in equation (3.7) represents the “coefficients effect” and is 
the amount by which the average utilisation  rate of Muslims would change if Muslim attributes ( MiX
), rather than being evaluated at Muslim coefficients ( ˆ Mβ ), were, instead, evaluated at Hindu 
coefficients ( ˆ Hβ ).  Under the “coefficients effect” in equation (3.5) the set of Muslim attributes ( MiX ) 
are evaluated using two different coefficient vectors – that of Muslims and Hindus.   
 The second term in square brackets in equation (3.7) represents the “attributes effect”:  it is 
the difference in the average utilisation rates which would result from both Hindu ( HiX ) and Muslim 
attributes ( MiX ) being evaluated using a common coefficient vector, that of Hindus ( ˆ
Hβ ).  Under the 
“attributes effect”, the same (Hindu) coefficient vector is used to evaluate two different attribute 
vectors – that of Hindus and Muslims.  Both equations (3.6) and (3.7) show, in their different 
representations, the overall difference between Hindus and Muslims in their average utilisation rates 
as the sum of differences due to: (i) inter-group differences in coefficients (the “coefficients effect”) 
and (ii) inter-group differences in attributes (the “attributes effect”). 
 In the context of ICDS benefit utilisation, ‘attributes” refer to all those factors – social group, 
gender of the last born child, region, location, highest education, consumption quintile, age group, and 
freedom to travel unaccompanied - which determine whether benefits are utilised. The coefficients of 
the equation then translate these attributes into probabilities of benefit utilisation. Lying at the heart of 
this translation is a set of attitudes that a particular social group has towards using anganwadi 
services. Because different social groups have different coefficient vectors – or, equivalently, have 
different attitudes towards using anganwadi services - this translation could be different for the 
different social groups even if they had the same attributes.  
Some Methodological Qualifications  
 The method of computing the coefficients effect needs to be qualified in, at least, two 
respects.  First, this effect is computed conditional upon a given set of attributes.  If these attributes 
are added to, or subtracted from, then the size of the coefficient (or, attitudinal) effect would also 
change.  For example, if more or better data became available, then the coefficients effect computed 
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from the new data would be different from the original estimate.  So, there is no unique measure of 
the coefficients effect.  
 Second, even if one could establish a definitive vector of relevant attributes, a unique size of 
the coefficients effect might still not be established.  This is because the attributes contribution could 
be computed using either the coefficients of one group (Muslims in equation (3.6), above) or the other 
group (Hindus in equation (3.7), above) and the two methods may not yield the same result.  There is 
nothing in the methodology to suggest that one computation is to be preferred over the other.  
Consequently, the coefficients or attitudinal effect – computed as the difference between the overall 
difference and the contribution of attributes effect - would be different depending upon the coefficient 
vector used to compute the attributes contribution.   
 3.5 Decomposition Results  
 The probabilities computed from estimating the logit equation,  shown in Table 3.1, were 
used to put empirical flesh on equation (3.6), with the NMUC coefficient vector used as the basis for 
the decompositions; these results are shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for, respectively, SC and Muslim 
mothers.  Column 1 of the Table 3.2 and 3.3 shows, respectively, the mean probabilities obtained 
from evaluating the attributes of the SC and Muslim mothers at NMUC coefficients.  
<Tables 3.2 and 3.3> 
 For mothers in group Z (Z=SC, Muslims), these probabilities are defined as: 
 exp( ) ˆPr( 1) ( )
1 exp( )i






X β X β
X β
  (3.8) 
where: }{ , 1...ijX j J= =ZiX represents the vector of observations, for mother i belonging to group Z, 
on J variables which determine her likelihood utilising anganwadi services and 
}{ˆ , 1...NMUCj j Jβ= =NMUCβ is the associated vector of coefficient estimates for mothers belonging to 
the NMUC.  The mean probability of utilisation, shown in the column 1 of Tables 3.2 and 3.3, is the 
average of Pr( 1)iY = in equation (3.8) computed over all the mothers in group Z.  So, for example, 
column 1 of Table 3.1 show that if the attributes of SC mothers were evaluated at NMUC coefficients, 
their mean probability of utilising anganwadi services would have been: 27.3 percent for pregnancy 
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services; 39.8 percent for immunisation; 28.2 percent for health checks; 38.6 percent for growth 
monitoring; 24.7 percent for education; and 39 percent for food.  
 Column 2 of the Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show, respectively the mean probabilities obtained from 
evaluating the attributes of SC and Muslim mothers (Z=ST, SC, NMOBC, MOBC, and MUC) at own 
group (that is, SC or Muslim) coefficients.   
 For mothers in group Z (Z=SC or Muslim), these probabilities are defined as: 





exp(X β ) = F(X β )
1 + exp(X β )
  (3.9) 
where, as before }{ , 1...ijX j J= =ZiX represents the vector of observations, for mothers i belonging to 
group Z, on J variables which determine her likelihood of utilising anganwadi services, and 
}{ˆ , 1...Zj j Jβ= =Zβ is the associated vector of coefficient estimates for mothers belonging to group 
Z.  The mean probability of utilisation, shown in column 2 of Tables 3.2 and 3.3, is the average of 
Pr( 1)iY = in equation (3.9), computed over the mothers in group Z.
11 For SC mothers (Table 3.2), 
these were: 33.3 percent for pregnancy services; 45.4 percent for immunisation; 33.3 percent for 
health checks; 43.3 percent for growth monitoring; 26.7 percent for education; and 45 percent for 
food.  
 The difference between the mean probabilities reported in columns 1 (group Z attributes 
evaluated at NMUC coefficients) and 2 (group Z attributes evaluated at group Z coefficients) of 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are shown in column 3 as the “attitudes effect”.  This is because differences, as 
discussed earlier, between the estimated coefficients for the groups reflect differences between them 
in their attitudes towards utilising anganwadi services.  Asterisks against any of the numbers in 
column 3 of the tables indicate whether the attitudes effect was significantly different from zero.  
 Column 4 shows the mean probabilities resulting from NMUC attributes evaluated at own 
(NMUC) coefficients12 while column 5 shows the mean probabilities resulting from group Z (SC in 
                                                     
11 Note that these are different from those shown in Table 3.1 which were computed by assuming that all the 
mothers, across all the social groups, were from the SC. The probabilities shown in column 2 of Table 3.2 were 
computed over only SC mothers. 
12 See preceding footnote. 
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Table 3.2 and Muslim in Table 3.3) attributes evaluated at NMUC coefficients  (these are identical to 
those shown in column 1 of Tables 3.2 and 3.3).  The difference between these two mean probabilities 
– shown in column 6 – represents the attributes effect because it emanates from two different sets of 
attributes (that of the NMUC and of group Z) evaluated at the same coefficient vector (that of the 
NMUC). Column 7 shows the overall difference in mean probabilities between the NMUC and group 
Z (this is the sum of the values reported in columns 3 and 6); column 8 and 9 show, respectively, the 
attitude and attributes contributions where these are the attitude and attributes effects expressed as a 
percentage of the overall gap.  
 Table 3.2 shows that, for every ICDS benefit, the likelihood of utilising that benefit was 
always lower for mothers from the NMUC than from the SC: the gap in their mean probabilities of 
utilising anganwadi services, as shown in column 7 of Table 3.2, was always negative and these 
ranged from -11.1 percentage points for children’s food to -4.4 points for children’s education.  These 
gaps could be explained by the fact that, relative to SC mothers, mothers from the NMUC had less 
“utilisation favourable” attitudes (coefficients) and also less “utilisation friendly” attributes. For 
example - remembering that, as Table 3.1 showed, the PUR of mothers was inversely related to their 
education level and that the PUR was lowest for mothers who were graduates – only 2 percent of SC 
mothers, compared to 13 percent of NMUC mothers, were educated up to graduate level.  In a similar 
vein, remembering that, as Table 3.1 showed, the PUR of mothers was inversely related to their 
HPCE, only 11 percent of SC mothers, compared to 32 percent of NMUC mothers, were in 
households which belonged to the highest quintile of HPCE. 
 The relative size of these attitude and attribute contributions differed, however, by the type of 
benefit. The attributional contribution was largest (and ipso facto the attitudinal contribution was 
smallest) for children’s education (55 and 45 percent could be explained by the fact that, relative to 
NMUC mothers, SC mothers had, respectively,  attributes and attitudes favourable to utilising this 
benefit) and it was smallest for children’s health checks (28 and 72 percent could be explained by the 
fact that, relative to the NMUC, the SC had, respectively,  attributes and attitudes favourable to 
utilising this benefit).  So, in terms of using anganwadi services, attitudinal and attributional forces 
were working in the same direction for SC mothers vis-à-vis their NMUC counterparts: in terms of 
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both attitudes and attributes, SC mothers were more inclined to use anganwadi services than mothers 
from the SC.     
 Comparing mothers from the NMUC with Muslim mothers, Table 3.3 shows that, for five of 
the six anganwadi benefits – the exception being food - the likelihood of utilising that benefit was 
always higher for mothers from the NMUC than Muslim mothers: the gap in their mean probabilities 
of utilising anganwadi services, as shown in column 6 of Table 3.3, was positive and these ranged 
from 3.3 percentage points for children’s immunisation to 1 percent point for children’s education.  
As before, this finding raises two questions.  Firstly, were Muslim mothers less willing to utilise 
anganwadi services than NMUC mothers  simply because they were Muslims – that is, was there a 
difference in attitudes (coefficients) between them?  Secondly, were Muslim mothers’ attributes, vis-
à-vis mothers from the NMUC, such that they were less willing to utilise anganwadi services?   
 Table 3.3 offers a clue as what the answers to these questions might be.  Column 2 of Table 
3.3 shows that the likelihood of Muslims utilising anganwadi immunisation services was 32.2 
percent. If, however, this likelihood was evaluated in the hypothetical situation in which Muslim 
mothers had the same attitudes (coefficients) towards using anganwadi immunisation services as did 
mothers from the NMUC – in other words, evaluating Muslim attributes at NMUC coefficients – this 
likelihood would have risen to 37.5 percent or, by 5.3 percentage points. So, Muslim mothers’ 
attitudes towards using anganwadi immunisation services were less favourable than those of NMUC 
mothers.  On the other hand, the attributes of Muslim mothers, in terms of using anganwadi services, 
were more favourable than those of NMUC mothers.  For example – again remembering that, as 
Table 3.1 showed, the PUR of mothers was inversely related to their education level and that the PUR 
was lowest for mothers who were graduates – only 2 percent of Muslim mothers, compared to 13 
percent of NMUC mothers, were educated up to graduate level; similarly, again remembering that, as 
Table 3.1 showed, the PUR of mothers was inversely related to their HPCE, only 12 percent of 
Muslim mothers, compared to 32 percent of NMUC mothers, were in households which belonged to 
the highest quintile of HPCE. 
 So, in terms of using anganwadi services, there were opposing forces at work on Muslim 
mothers vis-à-vis their NMUC counterparts. In terms of attitudes, Muslim mothers were less inclined, 
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but in terms of attributes they were more inclined, to use anganwadi services.  The fact that their 
observed usage of anganwadi services was lower than that the NMUC suggested that attitudinal 
reluctance prevailed over attributional inclination.  The figures cited in columns 3, 6 and 7 of Table 
3.3 confirm this – the overall gap of 3.3 points (column 7) between NMUC and Muslim mothers, in 
their utilisation of anganwadi immunisation services, would have been -2 points (column 6) – that is, 
the NMUC utilisation rates would have been smaller than that for Muslims – if attributes had been the 
only source of difference between the two groups. However, attitudinal differences meant that, in the 
absence of attribute differences, the gap between NMUC and Muslim mothers, in their utilisation of 
anganwadi immunisation services, would have been 5.3 points (column 3) – that is, the NMUC 
utilisation rates would have been higher than that for Muslims.  In the face of both attitudinal and 
attributional differences, the overall gap for anganwadi immunisation, was 3.3 points as shown under 
column 7 of Table 3.3.   
3.6. The Link between the Quality of Anganwadi Services and their Utilisation 
 As the previous sections showed, the evidence is that the utilisation rate of anganwadi 
services was higher for mothers and children from “vulnerable” groups (SC and ST) compared to 
those from relatively “privileged” groups (NMUC: non-Muslim Upper Classes). If this was purely a 
supply side effect, such that these services were directed towards vulnerable groups (and away from 
privileged groups), then the ICDS could be credited for this “socially responsible” orientation of 
services.  However, if mothers from the privileged group, relative to those from the vulnerable group, 
spurned anganwadi services then the higher utilisation of anganwadi services by the latter would arise 
because of demand-side effects.  Mothers and children from privileged group would not utilise 
anganwadi services - not because they could not, but because they did not wish to, do so. This effect 
could arise if it was generally perceived that the quality of anganwadi services was poor compared to 
that of equivalent “market-provided” services. Then, in the face of this general perception of quality 
difference, it would be persons from the privileged group, with their superior resources, who were 
more able and willing to buy the higher quality service. 
 There is a considerable amount of evidence about the poor quality of anganwadi services 
particularly with respect to supplementary feeding and early education. Davey et. al. (2008), in 
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interviews with 200 users of anganwadi services at 20 anganwadis in Delhi reported that a majority 
(53 percent) of respondents were dissatisfied with the quality of services provided, the highest levels 
of dissatisfaction being recorded for: the location of, and space available in, the anganwadis (69 
percent of respondents), the poor quality of food distributed (67 percent of respondents), and irregular 
pre-school education (57 percent of respondents).   
Qadiri and Manhas (2009) in a study of 200 parents in the Kashmir Valley found that 71 
percent of parents regarded the anganwadis as “ill-equipped to provide pre-school education. The 
teachers are not properly trained …and there is no proper schedule or curriculum”.  Dhingra and 
Sharma (2011) in a random sample of 60 anganwadis in Jammu and Kashmir pointed to the lack of 
adequate facilities “in terms of space (both indoor and outdoor), quality of accommodation, drinking 
water and toilet facilities, furniture and fixtures and teaching learning material in anganwadis.” In a 
World Bank report, Gragnolati et. al. (2005) also drew attention to the poor facilities at anganwadis – 
most anganwadis had no toilet facilities and cooking space was typically inadequate – and to supply-
side inadequacies, “especially issues of access, information, and irregularity of food supply”.  They 
also pointed out that, in the context of the Supplementary Nutrition component of the ICDS program 
“field studies have shown that food is sometimes badly cooked, dry, and salty and should be 
supplemented by sugar, rice, or vegetables to be more wholesome and palatable to children”.  Most 
recently, Barnagarwala (2017) has pointed out the contents of the ready-to-eat Take Home Rations 
(THR) packets, provided as a supplementary diet to children, are often fed to families’ livestock 
because it is so unpalatable. 
The idea that faced with a drop in product quality, some customers abandon a product for a 
competing product while other customers remain loyal to it (perhaps, at the same time, voicing their 
discontent) has been analysed by Hirschman (1970).   On the basis his “exit-voice” theory of market 
behaviour by consumers, the provision of anganwadi services poses a conundrum. If they are to be 
directed towards vulnerable mothers and their children, then the quality of the services needs to be 
low for it is low quality which keeps away mothers from the privileged groups.  On the other hand, 
any attempt to raise the quality of services will attract mothers from the privileged groups and erode 
accessibility by vulnerable group mothers. 
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With fixed resources, ICDS providers have to choose an appropriate mix of quality and 
quantity of a service: lower service quality means more of the service can be provided; on the other 
hand, attempts to raise quality means that service quantity has to be reduced.  In Figure 1, below the 
curve TT represents the trade-off between quality and quantity: the slope of TT represents the rate at 
which, at the margin, quality can be transformed into quantity.13 The points X and Y represent the 
minimum acceptable quality levels to mothers from the privileged and vulnerable groups respectively:  
mothers from the privileged group will not use the service at, or below, the quality at X and mothers 
from the vulnerable group will not use the service at, or below, the quality at Y.   
The line YZV represents demand for the service by mothers from the vulnerable group. The 
segment YZ of this line also represents market demand since, up to Z, demand by mothers from the 
privileged group is zero. After Z, when demand by mothers from the privileged group is positive, 
market demand is represented by ZW: for any quality level, market demand (ZW) exceeds demand by 
mothers from the vulnerable group (ZV) by the amount of demand by mothers from the privileged 
group. 
So, for a level of quality level between points Y and X, there is excess supply: supply by the 
government exceeds demand by mothers from the vulnerable group. For the quality level represented 
by the point X, demand equals supply. Lastly, for quality levels in excess of that at X, there is excess 
demand: the total of demand by mothers from both groups exceeds total supply.              
Universal Utilisation of ICDS 
 This chapter suggested that a good ICDS program would be one in which mothers from 
privileged groups participated less, and mothers from vulnerable and marginalised groups participated 
more, consistent with a satisfactory quality of anganwadi services.  While it makes sense to direct 
limited government resources to needier groups, two questions arise.  First, are resources limited?  Or 
is the bigger problem that most allocated resources don’t make it to the village level?  Second, it may 
be that including better-off and more powerful groups in a program would improve the quality of 
services for everyone.  
                                                     
13 That is, how much of quality one would have to give up to get an additional unit of quantity. 
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 The Central Vigilance Committee (CVC) on the public distribution system (PDS) appointed 
by the Supreme Court has said that the criteria for the selection of Below Poverty Line (BPL) 
households is inappropriate.14 The finding of the CVC shows that there are large number of inclusion 
and exclusion errors in the provision of below poverty line (BPL) and Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) 
cards. The IHDS-2011 showed that 15 percent poor households in the country (that is, those in the 
lowest quintile of HPCE) did not have a ration card. The other alarming fact is that 16.8 percent of 
households in the highest income quintile have BPL cards while only 49 percent of households in the 
lowest income quintile have BPL or AAY cards (Commissioners’ 7th report, 2007).  
 These facts show that government programmes targeted towards BPL households have 
inherent problems in directing services towards people in need. Access to subsidised food by the poor 
after the introduction of the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) has worsened at an all India 
level. The TPDS performs poorly not only in terms of its objective of providing services for the poor 
but also in terms of program implementation which is marked by leakages and corruption. But in 
states like Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Chhattisgarh where the public distribution system 
is universal or quasi-universal it covers poor people in need of subsidized grains (Himanshu 2013).  
 Further, the literature on the implementation of ‘universal’ programmes shows all poor and 
needy children are included in the programme (Commissioners’ 7th report, 2007).  Midday meals 
(MDM), which is another universal programme covering all the children going to school from classes 
1-8, provides an opportunity for the children from marginalized section to be included (Harris-White 
1994) and, consequently, poor and the marginalized children are ensured one full meal a day.  
Universality also means that there is pressure from the public to improve the quality of MDM and 
governments respond to such pressure. For example, the MDM menu in Tamil Nadu consists of a 
variety of food (including eggs 2-3 times a week) provided to the children. Even small problems in 
the programme are reported by the media placing the government under pressure to offer immediate 
redress.  Attempts in the 1990s to ‘target’ the PDS in Tamil Nadu met with public resistance and, in 
consequence, was made ‘universal’ (Harris-White 2004). 
                                                     
14 Seventh Report of the Commissioners of the Supreme Court in the case: PUCL v. UOI & Others. Writ 
Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001, November, 2007. 
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 Before 2006, the ICDS programme provided benefits to a limited number of persons.  
However, in the wake of a Supreme Court order, of December 13th, 2006, extending 
all anganwadi services to every child under the age of six, all pregnant women and lactating mothers 
and all adolescent girls, Dreze (2006) found that the number of anganwadis increased without any 
commensurate importance being given to improving the quality of services.  Consequently, many of 
the eligible beneficiaries opted out. Along with making anganwadi services a universal benefit there is 
also an urgent need to improve the quality of anganwadi services (Dreze 2006).15  
3.7. Conclusions 
 The ICDS Program, by addressing issues of early education, malnutrition, and morbidity is an 
imaginative response by the Indian government to the multi-faceted challenge of providing for the 
health and development of children and their mothers. In its implementation, however, the program 
embodies several inequalities. Although the ICDS policy stipulates that there should be one 
anganwadi per 1,000 persons (and 700 persons in tribal areas), the coverage is much better in the 
wealthier states. As Gragnolati et. al. (2005) show, ICDS coverage by state rises with per capita Net 
State Domestic Product with five states with the highest prevalence of underweight children – Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh – having the lowest coverage. At the same 
time, states like Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, which have a low prevalence of under nutrition, have 
high ICDS coverage.  
The second type of inequality is the distribution of anganwadis within states: in 1998, while 
only half the villages from the lowest two deciles of the all-India wealth distribution had anganwadis, 
the ICDS program covered 80 percent of the richest villages in India (Gragnolati et. al., 2005).  The 
third type of inequality is locational inequality within a village. Mander and Kumaran (2006) have 
observed that, in mixed-caste villages, the anganwadi was never located in the Scheduled Caste 
hamlet. 
                                                     
15 Tamil Nadu leads the way in nutrition programme for children with the first nutrition programme starting in 
1956. The quality of anganwadi services in Tamil Nadu is considered better than in most other states (Rajivan 
2006). Similarly, in Andhra Pradesh, forming village level committees involving different stakeholders in 
monitoring the programme has helped to improve the quality of anganwadi services and caters services to 




The fourth type of inequality is based on excluding – or, more accurately, restricting - persons 
from certain groups from using anganwadi services. Mander and Kumaran (2006) provide a 
comprehensive account about the forms that such exclusion/restriction take. To a large extent this 
involved the attitude of the service provider: anganwadi workers might be reluctant to collect children 
from lower caste hamlets; anganwadis might be more reluctant to enrol children from the lower 
castes, compared to those from the upper castes, if there was an overall ceiling on enrolment; lastly, 
lower caste parents might be anxious about how their children would be treated while at the 
anganwadi. 
However, notwithstanding the validity and, indeed, importance, of these points, the evidence 
is that, for whatever reasons, mothers from the SC and the ST were more likely – and Muslim mothers 
less likely - to use anganwadi services compared to non-Muslims, either from the upper classes or 
from the other backward classes.. This suggests that there is a complexity of factors underlying the 
observed outcome in terms of group beneficiaries. First, leavening the accounts of exclusion, there 
might be enlightened and progressive persons involved in the delivery of anganwadi services who 
actively promote the usage of these services by mothers from the SC and the ST. Second, there might 
be the perception among upper class non-Muslim mothers that the quality of anganwadi services is 
poor – in particular, poor quality food in supplementary nutrition and poor quality pre-school 
education - and that, recognising the importance of these services, they would prefer to obtain these 
elsewhere. So, while the anganwadis might, as a symbol of caste power, be located in the “main” 
village where the upper castes reside, it would be used relatively lightly by upper caste mothers. This 
is Hirschman’s (1970) “exit response” to poor quality products. 
Unfortunately, Hirschman’s other idea of a “voice response” – namely, those that remained in 
the market expressed their discontent over poor product quality and, thereby, effected improvement - 
does not carry much credibility when it comes to anganwadi services. First, there is the reluctance to 
even voice discontent. In their survey of 14 villages in four states, Mander and Kumaran (2006) 
remarked on the reluctance of villagers to criticise anganwadis, preferring, instead, to deflect blame 
on themself. Second, given the nature of the caste hierarchy in rural India, remaining silent in the face 
of bureaucratic highhandedness is probably a rational strategy for the lower castes since expressions 
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of discontent, rather than resulting in service improvements à la  Hirschman (1970), are more likely to 
result in a denial of service. Thirdly, even if the voice of the deprived was heard, and quality 
improvements in anganwadi services resulted, this would lead to the upper classes entering the market 
for anganwadi services and, thereby, pushing out those for whom these services were intended. That 
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Figure 3.1: Take-up of Anganwadi Benefits by Social Group 
 
NMUC=non-Muslim Upper Classes; NMOBC=Non-Muslim Other Backward Classes; SC=Scheduled Castes; ST=Scheduled Tribes. 
The numbers in the figure represent the percentage of mothers, aged 15-49, in a social group who availed of a particular benefit. 
Source: IDHS-2011 























































Figure 3.2: Take-up of Anganwadi Benefits by Mothers’ Education 
 
NMUC=non-Muslim Upper Classes; NMOBC=Non-Muslim Other Backward Classes; SC=Scheduled Castes; ST=Scheduled Tribes. 



























































Figure 3.3: Take-up of Anganwadi Benefits by Quintile of Household Per-Capita Consumption 
Expenditure 
 
NMUC=non-Muslim Upper Classes; NMOBC=Non-Muslim Other Backward Classes; SC=Scheduled Castes; ST=Scheduled Tribes. 



























































Figure 3.4: Take-up of Anganwadi Benefits by Region 
 
NMUC=non-Muslim Upper Classes; NMOBC=Non-Muslim Other Backward Classes; SC=Scheduled Castes; ST=Scheduled Tribes. 


























































Table 1: Predicted Probabilities of Take-Up of Anganwadi Benefits 
 Benefits while 
Pregnant & Lactating 




Health Check-up of 
Child 
(12,608 observations) 
Growth Monitoring of 
Child 
(12,608 observations) 
Education of Child 
(12,578 observations) 
Food for Child 
(12,593 observations) 
 Probability MP Probability MP Probability MP Probability MP Probability MP Probability MP 
Households’ Social Group             
Scheduled Tribe 0.446 0.187** 0.551 0.153** 0.434 0.147** 0.527 0.141** 0.304 0.060** 0.504 0.130** 
Scheduled Caste 0.317 0.058** 0.453 0.056** 0.338 0.051** 0.431 0.046** 0.264 0.019* 0.432 0.058** 
Non-Muslim OBC 0.313 0.055** 0.501 0.103** 0.343 0.056** 0.439 0.053** 0.250 0.006 0.421 0.047** 
Muslims 0.212 -0.047** 0.344 -0.054** 0.249 -0.03** 0.335 -0.050** 0.224 -0.020* 0.364 -0.010 
Non-Muslim Upper Class [R] 0.259  0.398  0.287  0.385  0.244  0.374  
Sex of Last Born Child             
Male 0.301  0.455  0.331  0.420  0.255  0.410  
Female 0.293 -0.008 0.445 0.010 0.318 -0.012 0.417 -0.003 0.251 -0.005 0.417 0.007 
Mothers’ Region of Residence             
North [R] 0.223  0.327  0.188  0.290  0.192  0.350  
Central 0.214 -0.009 0.415 0.087** 0.199 0.011 0.260 -0.030** 0.139 -0.053** 0.290 -0.060** 
East 0.430 0.206** 0.435 0.108** 0.392 0.204** 0.576 0.286** 0.281 0.089** 0.563 0.213** 
West 0.362 0.139** 0.628 0.300** 0.523 0.335** 0.636 0.346** 0.386 0.194** 0.529 0.179** 
South 0.441 0.217** 0.547 0.220** 0.568 0.380** 0.641 0.351** 0.477 0.285** 0.570 0.220** 
Mothers’ Location             
Rural [R] 0.358  0.504  0.368  0.464  0.287  0.464  
Urban 0.186 -0.173** 0.318 -0.186** 0.225 -0.143** 0.310 -0.154** 0.176 -0.111** 0.292 -0.172** 
Mothers’ Highest Education Level             
None 0.280 0.026 0.464 0.122** 0.315 0.057** 0.378 0.043** 0.243 0.100** 0.383 0.076** 
Primary 0.307 0.053** 0.470 0.129** 0.336 0.077** 0.451 0.115** 0.296 0.153** 0.458 0.151** 
Secondary 0.325 0.071** 0.461 0.120** 0.348 0.089** 0.453 0.118** 0.261 0.118** 0.437 0.129** 
Higher Secondary 0.262 0.007 0.393 0.052** 0.288 0.030 0.410 0.075** 0.248 0.105** 0.405 0.097** 
Graduate and above [R] 0.254  0.342  0.259  0.335  0.143  0.308  
Household per capita Consumption              
Lowest quintile 0.326 0.105** 0.465 0.050** 0.343 0.064** 0.459 0.108** 0.285 0.085** 0.471 0.156** 
2nd quintile 0.319 0.098** 0.465 0.050** 0.330 0.051** 0.430 0.080** 0.263 0.064** 0.430 0.115** 
3rd quintile 0.301 0.080** 0.458 0.044** 0.334 0.055** 0.411 0.060** 0.243 0.044** 0.395 0.080** 
4th quintile 0.255 0.034* 0.407 -0.008 0.295 0.016 0.369 0.018 0.217 0.017 0.349 0.035** 
Highest quintile [R] 0.221  0.414  0.279  0.351  0.200  0.315  
Mothers’ Age             
15-20 0.298 0.036 0.451 0.063** 0.290 0.014 0.397 0.038* 0.121 -0.157** 0.361 -0.015 
21-25 0.327 0.065** 0.476 0.088** 0.345 0.069** 0.438 0.080** 0.213 -0.065** 0.410 0.035** 
26-30 0.302 0.040** 0.462 0.073** 0.334 0.058** 0.425 0.066** 0.278 0.000 0.426 0.050** 
31-35 0.258 -0.004 0.415 0.026* 0.309 0.034** 0.407 0.049** 0.301 0.023 0.427 0.051** 
36-40 [R] 0.262  0.388  0.276  0.359  0.278  0.376  
Mothers’ Autonomy             
Can’t travel alone [R] 0.284  0.430  0.295  0.386  0.227  0.382  
Can travel alone 0.305 0.021** 0.462 0.032** 0.343 0.048** 0.437 0.050** 0.267 0.040** 0.431 0.049** 




Table 3.2: The Decomposition of Mean Probabilities of ICDS Benefit Utilisation when Scheduled Castes were evaluated at Non-Muslim Upper Classes Coefficients 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 






























Benefits while Pregnant 0.273 0.333 -0.06** 0.227 0.273 -0.046** -0.106 57 43 
Immunisation 0.398 0.454 -0.056** 0.355 0.398 -0.043** -0.099 57 43 
Health Check 0.282 0.333 -0.051** 0.262 0.282 -0.02** -0.071 72 28 
Growth Monitoring 0.386 0.433 -0.047** 0.361 0.386 -0.025** -0.072 65 35 
Education of Children 0.247 0.267 -0.02* 0.223 0.247 -0.024** -0.044 45 55 
Food for Children 0.390 0.450 -0.06** 0.339 0.390 -0.051** -0.111 54 46 
+This is ˆ( )P M HiX ,β of equation (3.6); 
++ this is ˆ( )P M MiX ,β of equation (3.6); 
+++ this is ˆ( )P H HiX ,β of equation (3.6); 
++++ this is ˆ( )P M HiX ,β of equation (3.6); 
+++++this is H MY Y−  of equation (3.6) 
** Significant at 5 percent level; * Significant at 10 percent level. 





Table 3.3: The Decomposition of Mean Probabilities of ICDS Benefit Utilisation when Muslims were evaluated at Non-Muslim Upper Classes Coefficients 

































Benefits while Pregnant 0.242 0.198 0.044** 0.227 0.242 -0.015 0.029 152 -52 
Immunisation 0.375 0.322 0.053** 0.355 0.375 -0.020* 0.033 160 -60 
Health Check 0.272 0.235 0.037** 0.262 0.272 -0.01 0.027 137 -37 
Growth Monitoring 0.370 0.322 0.048** 0. 361 0.370 -0.01 0.039 123 -23 
Education of Children 0.233 0.213 0.02 0.223 0.233 --0.01 0.01 200 -100 
Food for Children 0.363 0.353 0.01 0.339 0.363 -0.024** -0.014 -71 172 
+This is ˆ( )P M HiX ,β of equation (3.6); 
++ this is ˆ( )P M MiX ,β of equation (3.6); 
+++ this is ˆ( )P H HiX ,β of equation (3.6); 
++++ this is ˆ( )P M HiX ,β of equation (3.6); 
+++++this is H MY Y−  of equation (3.6) 
** Significant at 5 percent level; * Significant at 10 percent level. 















Transformation curve: Quality/Quantity 
Figure 3.5: The Quality-Quantity Trade-off by Different Customer Types 
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